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Sungwook KimAbstract
Future wireless networks are designed to cope with drastically increasing user demands. However, network
resources reach the limits of their capacity to user requirements. Recently, femtocell networks have attracted much
attention to enhance the efficiency of wireless resource usage. In this article, a new adaptive power control scheme
is developed for the femtocell network system. By using the concept of the weighted voting game, the proposed
scheme adaptively adjusts a transmit power level while ensuring relevant tradeoff between system efficiency and
fairness. This power control paradigm can provide the ability to practically respond to current communication
conditions and suitable for real network operations. Simulation results are presented to verify the effectiveness of
the proposed voting game-based scheme in comparison with the existing schemes.
Keywords: Femtocell networks, Game theory, Weighted voting model, Power control, Fairness, Resource allocation
problem1. Introduction
The emergence of new wireless technologies is expected
to support the remarkable growth in the number of
users. However, in spite of high network infrastructures,
wireless bandwidth is a particularly scare resource, espe-
cially when large amounts of data are required. A prom-
ising approach for the efficient wireless bandwidth usage
is through the cellular technology, which has greatly
enhanced the network capability. In cellular networks,
the capacity of a wireless link has increased by getting
the transmitter and receiver closer to each other. There-
fore, it is necessary to reduce cell sizes and transmit dis-
tance to improve cellular capacity [1,2].
The recent concept of femtocells offers an economic-
ally viable solution to achieving high cellular capacity
and improved coverage. A femtocell is a small indoor
area covered by a low-power access point, referred to as
femtocell access point (FAP). Usually, FAPs are situated
around high user density hotspots to improve communi-
cation capacity. Therefore, the deployment of femtocell
structure comprises a conventional cellular network plus
embedded femtocell hotspots. The most important
advantages of femtocell are very little upfront cost toCorrespondence: swkim01@sogang.ac.kr
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medium, provided the original work is properlyoffload huge traffic from the expensive cellular networks
and the ability to achieve high data rate in some places
where the macrocell cannot provide signals with high
quality. It is very meaningful in future wireless commu-
nication networks [1-3].
Key issues of femtocell operations are the design of ef-
fective power control protocols, which significantly
influence the wireless network performance [3]. In
addition, the limited wireless bandwidth has to be
shared fairly among several users. Fair resource assign-
ment is another prominent factor for the femtocell
management [4,5]. Due to these reasons, the develop-
ment of adaptive strategies for efficient power control
and fair bandwidth assignment algorithms plays a crit-
ical role in determining overall network performance.
However, it is a complex and difficult work under a
dynamically changing network environment.
In recent years, algorithmic game theory has received a
lot of attention in field of telecommunications. The reason
for this interest is that game theory focuses on the research
of intelligent game players, who can compete, cooperate,
and negotiate for their benefits. In telecommunication
domains, network agents are selfish and built to maximize
their payoffs without requiring human interventions.
Therefore, it can be modeled by means of game theory [6].
Cooperative game, also called coalition game, is a branch ofAccess article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
y/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
cited.
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situations. In a cooperative situation, the basic assumption
is that players make binding commitments and find it bene-
ficial to cooperate in the game. Therefore, the main inter-
est is to fairly distribute the outcome to each player
according to their contributions. Especially, the operations
contending for network resources rely on the cooperation
of the each network agents. Therefore, cooperation game
models are widely used for wireless network management
algorithms [7,8].
Weighted voting game (WVG) is a well-known co-
operative game model and a lot of researches have been
carried out in political science, economics, logic theory,
and distributed systems. In such games, each player has
a weight, and a coalition of players wins the game if its
total weight exceeds a certain quota. Therefore, the
WVG model can formulate a decision-making process
that is designed to give different amounts of influence
to different members [6,9,10]. In femtocell networks,
network agents must take a joint decision leading to a
certain outcome, which may have a different impact on
each of the agents. Therefore, voting-based decision-
making procedure is an attracting model for the
femtocell network management.
Inspired by the preceding discussion, we propose a new
femtocell network power control scheme based on the
WVG. In the proposed scheme, each mobile user is
assigned a non-negative weight and makes a vote in favor
of a specific femtocell base station. If the total weight of
those voting is equal to or greater than the pre-defined
value, that femtocell becomes to be a winner and can
control its downlink power level. However, this efficient-
oriented approach may lead to throughput unfairness. To
avoid this unfairness problem, we characterize the concept
of fairness, which is considered explicitly at the design
stage of power control algorithm. Therefore, power and
bandwidth in the winning femtocell are dynamically
adjusted to provide a balanced solution. Based on the self-
adaptability and real-time effectiveness, the main novelty
of the proposed scheme is the ability to ensure relevant
tradeoff between efficiency and fairness.
Many literatures and the Small Cell Forum (www.
smallcellforum.org) support the wide-scale adoption of
femtocell. Lopez-Perez et al. [11] studied a downlink case
for WiMAX femtocell networks. Valcarce et al. [12] ap-
plied a finite-difference time domain method to predict
the coverage of WiMAX femtocells. Lopez-Perez et al.
[13] used a centralized method of dynamic frequency
planning to minimize the overall femtocell network
interference to allocate the bandwidth to femtocells.
Sundaresan and Rangarajan [14] studied the resource
management problem in orthogonal frequency-division
multiple access (OFDMA) femtocells and proposed a
location-based allocation scheme between macrocells andfemtocells to adapt the varying user population. In [15],
resource sharing and access control in OFDMA femtocell
networks are studied, where users’ selfish characteristics
are considered and an incentive mechanism is designed
for subscribers to share the resource of femtocell base
stations. In [16], the problem of cross-tier interference in
autonomous femtocell networks is studied by using cogni-
tive radio technology to realize the cognitive radio re-
source management. And a strategic game is proposed to
implement the interference mitigation. The interference
management for long-term evolution (LTE) networks with
femtocells using cognitive radio technology is investigated
in [17]. Then based on a distributed architecture for
LTE networks, the authors recommend to use two game
theoretical mechanisms to mitigate the cochannel inter-
ference. In [18], a distributed power control algorithm
is proposed that enables users to eventually achieve
their fixed target SINRs. As long as all the SINR targets
are feasible, this iterative algorithm converges to a
Pareto-optimal solution at a minimal aggregate transmit
power.
Recently, two interesting femtocell power control
schemes have been presented. The Power Control in
Overlay Femtocell (PCOF) scheme in [19] can properly
control the quality of service (QoS) in the femtocell
users. With feasibility conditions, new joint power con-
trol and dynamic channel re-allocation procedures are
suggested such that the QoS of users was ensured all
the time. In the PCOF scheme, the fundamental
capacity limitation of spatial bandwidth sharing among
a macrocell user and a femtocell user is identified.
In addition, a downlink power control problem is
formulated to address the co-channel interference, as
well as provide QoS to both the macrocell user and the
femtocell users. Therefore, the PCOF scheme is a joint
power control, channel management, and admission con-
trol procedure such that the priority of the macrocell users
is always ensured. The Game Theoretic Power Control
(GTPC) scheme [20] is proposed as a power control
algorithm by using a non-cooperative game model. This
scheme formulates a payoff function to provide fairness
and minimize interference by considering loads of
individual femtocells. In addition, the GTPC scheme
proves that this payoff function can be appeared as a
supermodular type. The GTPC scheme can be applied to
the decentralized environment, and leads transmission
power to reach a steady-state condition, i.e., Nash equilib-
rium. Through mathematical analysis and numerical
results, the authors show that the GTPC scheme has
several good characteristics. All the earlier works have
attracted a lot of attention and introduced unique
challenges. Compared to these schemes [19,20], the
proposed scheme attains better performance for femtocell
network systems.
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Section 2 presents the proposed algorithms in detail. In
Section 3, performance evaluation results are presented
along with comparisons with the PCOF and GTPC schemes
proposed in [19,20]. Through simulation, we show the abil-
ity of proposed scheme to achieve high accuracy and
promptness in dynamic network environments. Finally,
concluding remarks are given in Section 4.2. Proposed power control algorithm
In this section, we examine the applicability of WVG to
design a power control algorithm, and the proposed
scheme is explained in detail. The proposed scheme is
designed based on the WVG and can provide a well-
balanced network performance under rapidly changing
network environments.2.1. WVG-based selection algorithm
In cooperative games with a finite set (N) of players, a
function v is defined as v : 2N→R, such that (∅ ) = 0 and
v(M) ≤ v(N) whenever M  N. It is based on the assump-
tion that each player should decide whether he/she join a
coalition or not. An important subclass of cooperation
games is the WVG, which has been applied in various pol-
itical and economic organizations for structural or consti-
tutional purposes. A WVG is represented by the voting
body [q; ω1, . . .,ωn] where ωi represents the voting weight
of player i and q (0 < ωi < q) is the quota needed to win.
All the weights and quota are positive real numbers. If
W Sð Þ≥q where Sð Þ ¼
X
i∈S
ωi , a coalition S of players
S  Nð Þ is winner and v Sð Þ ¼ 1. Otherwise, it is loser and
v Sð Þ ¼ 0. Therefore, v Sð Þ∈ 0; 1f g for any S and if S  T 
N then v Sð Þ≤v Tð Þ [9,10].
In this article, we develop a WVG model for users in
femtocell networks. To design the WVG, the questions
to be answered are what the weights and quota should
be, how to calculate outcomes of a weighted vote, and
finding the effective distribution of the resulting out-
come from their joint action [6,9]. Recently, voting game
approaches have been studied well. However, existing
approaches only concerned and focused on theoretical
modeling and mathematical analysis. Therefore, practical
implementation issues are not yet well developed [10].
From a fundamental viewpoint, the proposed scheme
places more emphasis on the practical implementation
in real world network operations.
In a dense traffic load area, a lot of FAPs are deployed
within small coverage area. Therefore, users can receive
many signals from the several neighbor FAPs. Under
the multi-FAPs environment, each user is responsiblefor selecting a FAP to maximize its own payoff. Usually,
the main interest of each user is to maximize the
amount of transmitted data with the lower energy con-
sumption. However, there is a fundamental tradeoff. To
capture this conflicting relationship, a utility function is
defined by considering the ratio of the throughput to
transmit power [21,22]. In the proposed game model,
the utility function for the ith user with kth FAP (Ui
k) is
defined as follows:
Uki Pð Þ ¼
Tki Pð Þ
upi




where u_pmin and u_pmax are the pre-defined minimum
and maximum uplink power levels. n and m are the num-
ber of macrocell users and FAPs, respectively. u_pi is the
uplink power level of ith user and P is the transmit uplink
power vector. Tki Pð Þ is the throughput of ith user by using
kth FAP. Usually, throughput is defined as the number of
information bits that are transmitted without error per
unit-time. In wireless communications, it can be achieved
with the SINR in the effective range [21,22]. Therefore, to
estimate the throughput of each user, his SINR should be
obtained first. A general formula for the ith user’s SINR
from the kth FAP γki Pð Þ
 
is defined as follows [21,22]:






; s:t:; 1≤t≤m; ð2Þ
where σi is the background noise power, which is typically
fixed value. hik(or hit) refers to the ith user’s path gain from
the kth (or tth) FAP. In this article, we follow the
assumption in [22]; users’ device transmitters use variable-
rate M-QAM, with a bounded probability of symbol error
and trellis coding with a nominal coding gain. Therefore,
the uplink throughput of the ith user from the kth FAP
Tki Pð Þ
 
can be expressed as





where Wi is the assigned channel bandwidth in the ith
user, and Ω (Ω ≥ 1) is the gap between uncoded M-QAM
and the capacity, minus the coding gain [22]. By combin-
ing (1) with (3), the utility function for the ith user from










where Pi is the uplink transmit power vector without the
user i. In a distributed self-regarding fashion, each individ-
ual user in the femtocell network is independently
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To maximize the network throughput, each user’s
received payoff based on the utility function is a critical
factor. In this article, we shall assume that each voter’s
weight is defined as his payoff (ωi = Ui) and the quota




ωi; s:t:; ρmin≤ρ≤1 ð6Þ
where ρ is a decision factor for the quota. Under dynam-
ically changing environments, a fixed value of ρ cannot
effectively adapt to the current network condition.
Therefore, the ρ value should dynamically be adjustable.
In order to implement the ρ value adjustment, we parti-
tion the time-axis into equal intervals of length
unit_time, and the parameter ρ can dynamically be
decreased (or increased) by Δρ. The value of ρ (ρmin ≤
ρ ≤ 1) is multiples of Δρ, and we set Δρ = 0.1 in this study.
When a winner FAP is decided, the current ρ value is
increased by Δρ. If no FAP becomes to be a winner during
the predefined time period (T_P), the current ρ value
is determined as ρ = min(ρ − Δρ, ρmin).
2.2. Fairness-based resource control algorithm
Fairness is a prominent issue for the network manage-
ment. However, fairness-oriented control approaches
may lead to a system inefficiency, which degrades total
network performance quite seriously [4]. Therefore, the
most proper combination of the efficiency and fairness
requirements is the major issue. In this article, the fair-
ness is defined as an equitable transmission rate for dif-
ferent individual users. To characterize the fairness
notion, we follow the Jain’s fairness index [4], which has
frequently been used to measure the fairness of network
resource allocations. The fairness among users in the
winning coalition S FSð Þ is defined as follows:
FS ¼
X









The range of FS is varied from 0 to 1. To improve the FS,
the channel bandwidth for each user (W) is adjusted. For
the fair-bandwidth allocation, the most common idea is
max–min fairness concept [5]. It aims at allocating asmuch as possible to poor users, while not unnecessarily
wasting resources. However, to achieve max–min fair
rates, global information is needed. Therefore, this ap-
proach requires huge exchange of information [5]. In this
article, based on the max–min fairness notion, we propose
a practical protocol to implement fair-based resource allo-
cation in the winning coalition S. The main goal of the
proposed algorithm is to distribute bandwidth for each
user’s communication as evenly as possible, without un-
duly reducing system efficiency. First, the minimum band-
width allocation amount (M_a) is estimated by the using
fairness index FSð Þ: And then, additional allocation amount
(A_a) for each user is defined according to each through-
put. The assigned bandwidth for the user i Wi;i∈S is
calculated as follows:
Wi ¼ Maþ Aai ð8Þ




¼ η TWS  FS  TWSð Þ½  ¼ and η
¼ 1






where TWS , nS are the total bandwidth amount and the
number of users in the coalition S, respectively. A_ai is an
additional allocation for the user i and η is a control factors
for the inverse weighted allocation. According to (8), the
channel bandwidth adjustment continues until all the
users’ bandwidths in S are re-assigned.
2.3. Multi-objective utility function for efficiency and
fairness
The proposed voting game model employs the double-
decision rule in which two conditions must be satisfied in
terms of efficiency and fairness. During the voting game, a
coalition S is winning if
X
i∈S
ωi ≥ Q. And then, the winning
FAP can select its downlink power level dpS
 	
, which is
adjusted within the pre-defined downlink power levels
(i.e., pS∈ dpmin . . . dpmax
n o
). To decide the downlink
power level, we consider not only the system efficiency,
but also the concept of fairness. To characterize the con-








Sj j  max
i
Udi dpS





is the user i’s downlink utility with dpS
power level. To deal with this efficiency-fairness combin-
ation control problem, a multi-objective utility function
(M_EF) is developed based on the weighted sum method.
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objective utility function (M_EF) is formulated as follows:








i¼1 Ti Pð Þð Þ
2
ð10Þ
where β controls the relative weights given to efficiency
and fairness. By choosing a different weight value, the
preference of the decision-maker is taken into account.
Under diverse network environments, we treat it as an on-
line decision problem and adaptively modify β value.
When the fairness of all users in a macrocell is high, we
can put more emphasis on the system efficiency. In this
case, a higher value of β is more suitable. When the sys-
tem fairness is low, the FAP’s power control decision
should strongly depend on the fairness. In this case, a
lower value of β is more suitable for system fairness. In
the online algorithm, the value of β is dynamically
adjusted based on the total system fairness (i.e., FN: the
fairness index of all users in a macrocell). By the real-time
network monitoring, the system can be more responsive
to current network conditions. Finally, the winning FAP’s
downlink power level PS
 





















þ 1 βð Þ 
X










2.4. The main steps of proposed algorithm
The main goal of proposed scheme is to ensure relevant
tradeoff between efficiency and fairness. Even though
the fairness-related solution concepts (e.g., the Shapley
value) are studied well, the computational complexity
makes it practically unable to implement in the realistic
network operation model. To maximize implementation
practicality, we would employ distributed and dynamic
online game methodologies to develop a power control
scheme. In general, due to heavy control and implemen-
tation overheads, centralized control approaches are im-
practical methods. But, a distributed mechanism can
transfer the computational burden from a central system
to the distributed nodes. In the proposed algorithm,
users make their control decisions in a self-regardingdistributed fashion. This distributed approach can dramat-
ically reduce the computational complexity and overheads
comparing to the traditional static centralized approach.
Usually, the traditional optimal and centric algorithms have
exponential time complexity. However, the proposed
scheme has polynomial time complexity for power control
decisions. Therefore, the proposed scheme can provide a
good tradeoff between the practical implementation com-
plexity and the optimized network performance.
In the proposed algorithm, the result of FAP’s decision
is the input back to users. At the end of each game’s iter-
ation, users dynamically re-estimate their decisions. This
feedback-based repeated process can analyze strategic
decisions and capture each user’s behavior, which is
defined as a power control algorithm. After a finite num-
ber of rounds, users’ decisions can reach an efficient net-
work solution. The main steps of the proposed power
control algorithm are given next.
Step 1: At the initial game iteration, each mobile user
dynamically selects the uplink power level (u_p) and
the most adaptable FAP to maximize his payoff
according to (5).






, this FAP becomes to
be a winner.
Step 3: For the coalition S of winning FAP, FS and M_a
are estimated based on (7) and (8), respectively.
Step 4: By using the bandwidth adjustment procedure,
each user’s channel bandwidth (W) in S is adjusted
according to (8).
Step 5: According to (11), the winning FAP selects the
best downlink power level to maximize the multi-
objective payoff.
Step 6: The result of FAP’s decision is the input back to
users. At the end of each game’s iteration, users
iteratively adapt their decisions (i.e., uplink power level
and FAP selection) to maximize their payoffs. This
approach can analyze the current strategic decision in a
distributed online manner.
Step 7: Every unit_time, the ρ and Q values are
examined and adjusted periodically.
Step 8: By using the dynamics of feedback-based
repeated process, FAPs and users can be interacting
with one another and make their decisions in a way to
reach an efficient network solution.3. Performance evaluation
In this section, the effectiveness of the proposed scheme
is validated through simulation; a simulation model is
proposed for the performance evaluation. With a simula-
tion study, the performance superiority of the proposed
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in the simulation model were as follows:
 The simulated system is assumed as a CDMA
system with one macro cell.
 3 FAPs and 20 mobile users are distributed
randomly over the cell area.
 The capacity of network bandwidth is 30 Mbps.
 Network performance measures obtained on the
basis of 50 simulation runs are plotted as a function
of network operation time.
 The durations of call services are exponentially
distributed.
 For simplicity, we assume the absence of physical
obstacles in the experiments.
Table 1 shows the system parameters used in the simu-
lation. In order to emulate a real network system and for a
fair comparison, we used the system parameters for a real-
istic simulation model [23].
Performance measures obtained through simulation are
system throughput, normalized user utility, network fair-
ness, etc. In this article, we compare the performance of the
proposed scheme with existing schemes—the PCOF
scheme [19] and GTPC scheme [20]. Even though these
existing schemes dynamically decide the transmitting
power level for wireless networks, there are several
disadvantages. First, these existing schemes cannot adap-
tively estimate the current network conditions. In addition,
these schemes operate the network system by the fixed
control parameters. Under dynamic network environments,
control mechanisms by using static thresholds can cause
potential erroneous decisions.
In Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4, the x-axis (a horizontal line)
marks the time lag. In order to implement the time-driven





T_P 10 unit_time The p
ρmin 1/m Pre-d
u_pmin, u_pmax 50 mW, 100 mW pre-d
d_pmin, d_pmax 50 mW, 100 mW Pre-d
unit_time 1 s Equal
M 1. . .6 Numb
σ 1 × 10−10 Backg
β 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 Contr
Parameter Initial Desc
u_p, d_p 50 mW Uplinof length unit_time. The y-axis (a vertical line) represents
the normalized value for each performance criteria.
Figure 1 compares the performance of each scheme in
terms of the system throughput. It is measured as a
normalized serviced data amount. From the network
providers’ point of view, it is a very important factor. It
is shown that under initial operation time, the system
throughput is virtually the same for all the schemes.
However, as the network operation time increases, the
system throughput of proposed scheme is better than
the other schemes. Due to the inclusion of the adaptive
online feedback approach, we can observe that the
proposed scheme gains the better throughput.
Figure 2 shows the comparison of the normalized user
payoff. All the schemes have similar trends. However, the
feature of dynamic game-based model can ensure the excel-
lent user’s payoff under dynamic environment situations.
Therefore, the proposed scheme can effectively adapt to
the current wireless network condition while providing
the better performance than other schemes.
Figure 3 indicates the fairness of macrocell network. In
this article, the macrocell network fairness (NF) is defined








i¼1 Ti Pð Þð Þ
2
ð12Þ
where n is total number of users in the macrocell network.
NF is the same as the β value in (10). An intelligent fairness
policy, like the proposed scheme, makes the system adapt-
able to achieve an excellent fairness in the macrocell net-
work. Therefore, the proposed scheme can maintain a
significant better fairness than the other existing schemes.
It is highly desirable for the operation of multi-user system.ts
ription
er of wireless mobile users
er of FAPs
ol factor to adjust ρ value
redefined time period to control ρ value
efined minimum ρ value
efined minimum and maximum uplink power levels
efined minimum and maximum downlink power levels
intervals of time-axis length
er of power levels (strategies)
round noise power in wireless communications
ol factor for the relative efficiency and fairness weight
ription Values
k, downlink power level 50,60,70,80,90,100 mW


























Figure 1 System throughput.
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which is also obtained according to the formulae of (12).
However, in this case, n is the number of users in the FAP.
Due to the inclusion of the fairness-oriented control
algorithm, we also observe that the proposed scheme
can gain the higher FAP fairness than the PCOF and
GTPC schemes.
The simulation results shown in Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4
demonstrate that the proposed scheme generally exhibits



























Figure 2 Normalized user payoff.schemes. Based on the adaptive real-time monitoring,
the proposed algorithm is flexible, adaptable, and able to
sense the dynamic changing network environment. This
feature leads to a balance appropriate network perform-
ance while other schemes [19,20] cannot offer such an
attractive network performance.
4. Summary and conclusions
The femtocellular network is one of the most promising fu-


































Figure 3 Network fairness.
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network operations, appropriate power control strategy is a
crucial issue to enhance the network performance. In this
article, we propose a new fair-efficient power control
scheme based on the WVG model. By using this dynamics
of feedback loop, FAPs and users can be interacting with


















Figure 4 Fairness in FAP.rapidly changing network environments, the proposed vot-
ing game-based approach is an effective way to reach a glo-
bally desirable network performance between two
conflicting objectives—efficiency and fairness. From simula-
tion results, we can confirm that the proposed power con-
trol scheme outperforms existing schemes in terms of
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